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Ethics, Religion and the Good Society: New Directions in a Pluralistic World, 
edited by Joseph Runzo. Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992. 200 pp. & 
xxiii. 
PAUL J. WEITHMAN, University of Notre Dame. 
This collection explores a number of new directions in religious ethics. It 
comes at a time when new directions seem necessary to navigate this well-trod 
field, for there is in politics, in religion and in the academy a new and heightened 
awareness of the pluralism to which the volume's subtitle refers. Moreover, as 
the book's preface and cover text suggest, pluralism now meets with a different 
attitude than once it did. Pluralism, editor Joseph Runzo writes, once seemed a 
"regrettable set of wounds to be sutured" (p. xii). Now "[p]eople living in a 
pluralistic age [ ... ] consider it both natural and enriching for humankind." 
There are, of course, a plurality of pluralisms and exploring the new direc-
tions all demand would be an enormous task. The preface suggests that Ethics, 
Religion and the Good Society will treat of just two: pluralism "within a 
specific religious tradition, like Christianity" (p. xii) and "the collective plu-
ralism of the great world religious traditions" (p. xii). In fact these remarks 
significantly understate the scope of this ambitious anthology. 
The book contains twelve essays, plus brief comments on five of them. In 
the first, Brian Hebblethwaite defends a plurality of models of the good 
Christian life. In the second, Robert Adams offers a metaphysics of goodness 
that purports to explain the plurality of intrinsic goods. Two essays on Chris-
tianity and social philosophy take as their starting point the pluralism of 
contemporary liberal democracies. John Langan's essay does not address any 
form of pluralism, but contributes to the pluralistic character of the volume 
by providing a Catholic voice. There is a section on religious pluralism 
world-wide, with contributions by Buddhist and Islamic scholars. The book's 
closing essay suggests that there are a plurality of moral "voices," since it 
alleges the distinctiveness of female moral experience. The essays together 
exhibit a plurality of methods, ranging from Adams's philosophical argument 
to McClendon's biographical approach. Runzo's own essay considers a plu-
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rality of philosophical positions, though whether this plurality results in a 
species of pluralism is hard to say. Presumably he does not consider this 
diversity of positions "enriching for humankind" since he tries to reduce it 
by refuting one of them. 
Whether or not Runzo's essay indeed treats of one of the forms of pluralism 
with which the book professes to be concerned, the essays collectively ad-
dress a bewildering number of pluralisms. As a result, the volume lacks the 
thematic unity the title and preface promise. It would have been better to 
have focused on one or two sorts of pluralism in this book, reserving the rest 
for another volume. Better to chart a couple of new paths carefully than to 
point out a larger number of promising trailheads. 
In addition to its lack of focus, the book exhibits some odd imbalances. 
The essays on Buddhism and Islam are extremely interesting, in part because 
of the unfamiliarity of their subject matter. They are also extremely brief and 
the book would have profited greatly from their expansion. There are some 
unfortunate omissions. An essay by a conservative theologian who is ambiva-
lent about or distressed by pluralism would have been quite interesting. The 
example of John Courtney Murray, who once described religious pluralism 
as "lamentable,"! shows that such a position is compatible with a commitment 
to the dialogue across divides that this book is meant to encourage. 
Despite these shortcomings, Ethics, Religion and the Good Society provides a 
valuable introduction to the diversity of contemporary religious ethics and to the 
diversity of concerns that move those who practice it. Even if the papers do not 
fit together as well as they might, they are singly very interesting and some are 
of extremely high quality. I will examine three of these essays in what follows. 
In "The Varieties of Goodness," Brian Hebblethwaite argues against the 
claim that there is a single model of life to which Christians should attempt 
to conform. Christians should concentrate on cultivating a proper relationship 
with God (pp. 4-5); this is, he intimates, both necessary and sufficient for a 
good Christian life (cf. p. 5). It is also compatible with recognizing that there 
is a wide variety of equally worthy ways to be a Christian. 
Hebblethwaite thinks his pluralism a departure from the traditional Christian 
ethics of, for example, Thomas Aquinas's virtue theory. Thus he writes of his 
concern with "the common assumption that Christian ethics itself is a uniform 
discipline, that Christianity has one identifiably moral ideal, and that the sum-
mum bonum can be spelled out as a single paradigm" (p. 4). A page earlier, he 
makes clear that he thinks he has parted company with Aquinas; there he suggests 
that Aquinas elucidated the summum bonum by elaborating one paradigm of the 
ideal Christian life (p. 3). A bit later, he indicates why he thinks virtue theory 
needs to be supplemented: to focus on the virtues, he suggests, is to neglect the 
"many different ways of being a Christian moral individual" (p. 6). 
Hebblethwaite's equation of the summum bonum in Aquinas with "a single 
paradigmatic ideal of human life" (p. 3) betrays a confusion. Eliminating the 
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confusion suggests, in a way that Hebblethwaite's paper does not, how he 
might supplement virtue theory along the lines he indicates. The summum 
bonum, in Aquinas's view, is not an ideal way of life. It is a good, namely 
God, enjoyed by those whose lives are characterized by an exercise of the 
theological virtues. Hebblethwaite could therefore retain Aquinas's idea of 
the summum bonum and maintain his own "Christian pluralism" simply by 
holding that there are a number of ways to enjoy and participate in that good. 
He could assimilate his position to virtue theory by arguing that the various ways 
to enjoy that good all engage the virtues in whose exercise a good life consists. 
Let me discuss an example that will make this possibility more vivid. 
Hebblethwaite correctly claims that some theologians, like Aquinas, seem to 
think that there is a single best way of life; often enough, as he intimates (cf. 
p. 7), this is a clerical life. Consider in this connection Aquinas's discussion 
of mendicant poverty. Aquinas argues that it is better to live under a vow of 
poverty than to give alms regularly from property over which one retains 
dominium. His argument turns on the premise that the virtues associated with 
property-holding are better exercised in the mendicant's single irrevocable 
renunciation of property than in the layperson's episodic giving of alms2• This 
seems to me a highly dubious claim. Someone denying it could appeal to 
Aquinas's discussion of virtues associated with the use of property to bring 
out the goodness of both the mendicant's life and that of the generous layper-
son. The example thus illustrates modification of a traditional virtue theory 
that edges it closer to Hebblethwaite's pluralism. 
Hebblethwaite advocates a supplementation rather than a rejection of virtue 
theory and I have tried to illustrate in what this supplementation might con-
sist. But why prefer supplementation to rejection? Hebblethwaite does not 
say. Let me indicate where he might fortify his view by judiciously grafting 
pieces of virtue theory onto it. Hebblethwaite stresses that one reason good 
Christian lives diverge is the diversity of circumstances in which Christians 
find themselves (p. 10). I would stress in addition that an ingredient of a good 
life is the ability to shape one's life to one's circumstances. This is an ability 
traditionally associated with the virtue of prudence. A fuller account of Chris-
tian pluralism would, I believe, have to include it. Moreover, Hebblethwaite 
notes that the diversity of good Christian lives "exhibit a family resemblance, 
recognizable in manifestations of the fruit of the same spirit and in the effects 
of personal relation to the same Lord" (p. 11). It is not clear what these 
"manifestations" and "effects" are. If they are habits of thought, sentiments, and 
conduct regarding the goods available through a relationship with God, then they 
are probably best conceived of as theological virtues. If this conjecture is correct, 
then a nuanced discussion of the theological virtues-Aquinas's, for example-
could be exploited to fill in the details of Hebblethwaite's view. 
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The enjoyment of divine goods is the subject of Robert Adams's essay 
"Platonism and Naturalism." In the view Adams defends "God would occupy 
[ ... J much of the role that is assigned to the Form of the Good in the 'middle 
dialogues' of Plato." God, on this view, is the supreme and transcendent good; 
other good things derive their goodness by "imaging" God. Among the 
strengths of this theistic Platonism, Adams argues, is its ability to explain 
significant features of our moral lives better than do alternative theories of 
value. In this essay, Adams argues that the explanatory power of his theory 
exceeds that of James Gustafson's theistic naturalism. 
One of the more interesting comparisons concerns the ability of each theory 
to explain why securing some goods-Adams considers ecological goods-is 
worth the sacrifice of certain human aims. Adams argues that the preservation 
of a species from extinction is an intrinsic good and that its intrinsic goodness 
gives humanity a reason to seek it even at the expense of projects of our own 
(p. 36). This intrinsic goodness, the intrinsic goodness associated with pres-
ervation of the African elephant, for example, is explained by the fact that 
the elephant "images" God. For Gustafson, on the other hand, our reasons 
for preserving the elephant depend upon our ability to discern divine purposes 
in nature, an ability Adams rightly questions (p. 33). 
I concede arguendo that theistic Platonism adequately accounts for what 
we are inclined to regard as intrinsic goodness and can do so better than 
naturalistic theories. There are, however, some values for which we might 
think other theories provide a more persuasive account. I want to query how 
Adams's theory might account for these. Adams notes that the notion of 
divine "vocations" will have a role in his theory (p. 37) and that there are 
proper and improper vocations for us to pursue, which depend upon God's 
purposes for us. How would theistic Platonism account for the goodness of 
individuals choosing their vocations for themselves rather than having them 
chosen for them by some Zossimaesque figure to whom they have submitted 
their will and who, ex hypothesi, will choose the appropriate vocation for them? 
Intrinsic goods are such that their goodness gives a reason to secure them. 
If the choosing-of-appropriate-vocation-V were itself intrinsically good, then 
the goodness of that complex would itself furnish a reason to secure it. It 
would therefore furnish a reason to make the choice of vocation V. But what 
gives reason to make a choice is the perceived appropriateness of vocation V, 
not the goodness of choosing it. Intrinsic goodness thus seems an unpromising 
account of the goodness of choosing a vocation for oneself. So too does instru-
mental goodness. While choosing may sometimes be a means or instrument to 
the thing chosen, this seems not to be so in the case of the choice of a vocation. 
Let us think of a vocation, roughly, as a commitment to values and projects that 
are central to one's plan of life. Then by the very act of choosing a vocation, an 
agent makes the commitment in which having a vocation consists. The act of 
choosing a vocation is therefore performative rather than instrumental. 
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The performative character of the choice of a vocation suggests one way 
in which Adams might account for the goodness of choice. He might note 
that in choosing a vocation, one is doing something else-expressing one's 
autonomy, perhaps-and might exploit this other description of the perform-
ance to explain its goodness. Perhaps Adams would say that in choosing the 
appropriate vocation, agents are faithfully imaging God and that the goodness 
of their choosing for themselves resides there. This would fit nicely with 
Adams's claim that goodness consists in imaging God. It would also dovetail 
neatly with Aquinas's claim that humans are made in God's image insofar as 
they possess the faculties necessary for choice3. 
How humans might image God by choosing a vocation is no doubt a 
complicated matter. It cannot be that agents image God by wanting the same 
object that God wants, since what is to be explained is not how agents image 
God by wanting, but how they image God by choosing. Moreover, as Aquinas 
points out, an agent's will can be good, not by her choosing what God wants, 
but by choosing what God wants her to choose. Adapting an unfortunate 
example of Aquinas's makes this clear. Someone may take it as her vocation 
to secure clemency for death-row inmates. Her choice will be good if this is 
the vocation God wants her to choose, even if God in fact wants the execu-
tions to take place for the sake of justice4• 
It might be that in choosing an appropriate vocation for herself, an agent 
makes a choice that is significantly like a choice that God makes. She thus 
resembles or images God because of the similarity of her choice to God's. 
According to Adams, God's nature is such that the whole created universe is 
an appropriate object of God's and only God's providential care (p. 31; p. 
42n4). Exercising this care over the universe is thus God's proper vocation. 
An agent might image God by choosing for her vocation a commitment to 
and care of an object appropriate for her nature and circumstances. But among 
the features of God's choice of vocation is that it is purely unconstrained. 
God freely chose to create the universe and God's purpose in doing so were 
arguably self-established. If the goodness of a human choice of vocation is 
located in its similarity to God's choice, then divine autonomy raises ques-
tions about how the goodness of human choice depends upon humans setting 
purposes for themselves. 
I allude to these questions, not because I think Adams lacks the resources 
to answer to them, but because one of the strengths of Adams's theory is its 
ability to account for intrinsic goodness. At least some alternative theories of 
value derive strength from their ability to explain, not intrinsic goodness, but 
the significance of choice. It is therefore crucial to determine how Adams's 
theory might account for it. I allude to these questions also because belief in 
the goodness of autonomous choice seems a natural concomitant of the atti-
tude toward pluralism that the book under review purports to explore. 
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John Langan's contribution critically examines crucial parts of John Paul 
II's Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. I want to focus on two points Langan makes near 
the close of his essay. Langan says that "this encyclical manifests a high 
proportion of assertion to argument and frequently crosses with unwarranted 
facility from analysis to admonition." These features, Langan continues, 
"trouble" him (p. 142). Langan also says that the encyclical seems to "put[] 
humanity in a box clearly marked for laggards and sinners" (p. 143), who are 
responsible for both the presence and the reform of unjust institutions. He 
canvasses a number of ways to escape the "box" and endorses one he thinks 
exemplified by the bloodless revolutions of Eastern Europe. To effect their 
escape, he argues, people must "understand that, in order to bring about this 
new order of society, they must withdraw from their involvement in the sinful 
structures of the old order. [ ... ] They must without resorting to force or 
relying on the weight of routine, break the hold of sin on their lives and their 
society" (p. 145). 
Langan's discussion makes no mention of what if any role religious belief, 
religious ethics or divine grace should play in people's "break[ing] the hold 
of sin on their lives and their society." Perhaps he thinks that secular political 
philosophy suffices to awaken a sense of injustice and elicit the motivation 
to change. But these are also legitimate objectives for religious ethical dis-
course. Moreover they are, at least under some circumstances, objectives 
better achieved by religious than by thoroughly secular discussion. Finally, 
they are objectives that can rarely be achieved by argument alone. Hortatory 
as well as analytical discourse is often necessary if people are to recognize 
"the hold of sin on their lives and their society" and to resolve to break it. If 
these suggestions are correct, then the escape route Langan plots presupposes 
a role for religious discourse that is hortatory in character. It presupposes, 
that is, a role for just the sort of discourse that "troubles" Langan in Sollici-
tudo Rei Socia lis . 
Ethics, Religion and the Good Society includes a number of other essays 
that repay careful reflection. The volume is a fine sampler of the diversity of 
contemporary religious ethics. It merits the attention of those interested in 
what new directions the field might take in an increasingly pluralistic world. 
NOTES 
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